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 1 Introduction
The idea that an economy or a group of people can get caught in a low-level
trap from which it is, in principle, possible to escape but no individual has it
within his or her power to break out of it is an old one in economics, but its
importance has remained undiminished. Among Tapan Mitra￿ s many ￿elds of
enquiry in economic theory, poverty traps has been a signi￿cant one. In 1995,
in a joint paper with Mukul Majumdar, for instance, he explores the relation
between increasing returns and poverty traps and how an economy can be caught
in poverty, though once it is wrenched out of the trap it can grow unassisted
(Majumdar and Mitra, 1995; see also Majumdar and Mitra, 1982; Dechert and
Nishimura, 1983). This work is a natural extension of the idea of vicious circle
of poverty to be found in Nurkse (1953) and Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and also
the idea that there is a close connection between underdevelopment and multiple
equilibria (Basu, 1997).
While the dominant discussion of low-level traps has occurred in the context of
a nation￿ s or a collectivity￿ s income, it is possible to carry the broad idea over to
other indicators of a nation￿ s well-being (see Ho⁄and Stiglitz, 2001). In the present
paper, we try to show that something similar may happen regarding literacy. A
nation can get caught in a low-literacy or low-education trap. Once caught in this
situation, it is not in the interest of any individual to incur cost and acquire a lot
of skills. It is the skill-lessness of others that makes it not worthwhile for each
individual to acquire much skills, and thus they are all trapped in a vicious circle.
Our analysis has important policy implications. A nation caught in a low-
literacy trap cannot break out of it just by providing schools for it is not the supply
of schools that is a bottleneck but the demand for higher education. Hence, the
rather abstract model that we are about to construct can shed light on signi￿cant
policy questions such as when do we need to make education compulsory and
when will the simple act of making schools available take care of the problem of
under-investment in human capital. The model sheds interesting light on how, in
2a certain class of equilibria, giving a subsidy to education may have no e⁄ect on
promoting education. In the process we get some insights into the design of policy
that will be e⁄ective.
The core of our model is based on the idea of an O-ring production function,
introduced in the literature by Kremer (1993) ￿ see also Kremer and Maskin
(1996). The idea is this. Since so much of today￿ s work takes the form of the
assembly line, either literally, as in the manufacture of cars, or, in e⁄ect, as in
software services, where small groups are engaged in doing di⁄erent parts of a
large job, that a malfunction in one part can undo the bene￿ts of the other tasks
that are done well. The metaphor is that of the space shuttle Challenger disaster
in 1986, which was caused by the malfunctioning of a tiny component of the
space-ship, the O-ring. The idea that there will be this kind of spillover e⁄ects
of education among workers seems natural enough and there has been a lot of
empirical and theoretical work on this (Rauch, 1993; Benabou, 1993; Redding,
1996; Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000; Kremer, Miguel and Thornton, 2004; Moretti,
2004).
In Kremer￿ s O-ring model, the skill that workers bring to their task is innate
to the worker. If, however, we introduce education in the model, whereby each
worker has the choice of incurring some cost (in terms of both time and money)
and improving their skills and ability to do their jobs better, then interesting
equilibria arise, including the possibility that workers will get caught in a low-
education trap. This is the central idea that is pursued in this paper and while
poverty traps are a pervasive topic in economics, low-literacy traps seem to have
received much less attention. The work most related to our paper is that by Jones
(2008). He constructs a random matching model in which there is endogenous
human capital accumulation. Each individual faces the choice to be trained as
a generalist or a specialist, with the value of being a specialist increasing as the
density of specialists in the population rise. In Jones￿model, for certain parameter
values, there is the possibility of multiple equilibria since the economy could be
one of specialists or generalists. Another related exercise (Basu and Weibull,
32003; Horowitz, 2008) studies the punctuality traits of a collectivity, where each
person bene￿ts from other people￿ s punctuality and also the marginal return to
increased individual punctuality rises with the level of other people￿ s punctuality.
This strategic complementarity easily leads to multiple equilibria, whereby two
societies of a priori identical individuals can get caught in, respectively, a tardy
and a punctual equilibrium.
2 Model
2.1 A Primer on O-Rings
It is useful to begin by brie￿ y summarizing the O-ring model, while at the
same time adapting it a little to our present need. There is one consumer good
in the economy. Its production takes place in factory units or, simply, factories.
Each ￿rm can own one or more factories. In each factory n tasks (n ￿ 2) are
done; each task being done by one worker. Denote a worker￿ s skill by q where
0 ￿ q ￿ 1: We can interpret q as the probability that the worker ￿nishes his or
her task successfully. Let qi be the skill-level that goes into task i, that is, the
worker employed on task i has a skill level qi and let B be the output produced
per worker in a factory when all tasks are performed successfully. The ￿ production
function￿in which x denotes the expected output is as follows:




It is easy to see that if all tasks are performed at skill level 1, then total output
from the factory will be nB and so the per worker output is B:
To start with, let us take the skill levels of workers to be exogenously given.
The decision-making by the ￿rms can be modeled in two di⁄erent ways. The
traditional route is to assume that there are many price-taking ￿rms and free
entry. Since there is a continuum of worker types, there is a continuum of wages,
one for each type of worker. Let w(q) be the market wage schedule exogenously
given to the ￿rms. We will throughout take the price of the product to be one.
4In this case the ￿rm￿ s problem is to choose n workers for operating a factory so



















In addition, Kremer (1993) proved that it is always in the ￿rm￿ s interest to
have all its tasks done by workers of the same skill level. This is called the "skill-
clustering theorem" in Basu (1997), where a short proof is available.
Theorem 1 (Skill-Clustering) If (q￿
1;:::;q￿
n) maximize a ￿rm￿ s pro￿t, then (in
addition to equation (2)) q￿
1 = ::: = q￿
n:
In light of the skill-clustering theorem, equation (2) can be written as
w0 (q) = qn￿1nB;
where q is the skill of labor chosen for each task by a ￿rm.
Since, in equilibrium, each ￿rm earns zero pro￿t, a ￿rm employing workers of
skill q must satisfy
qnnB ￿ nw(q) = 0
or, w(q) = qnB: (3)
Hence, we know that in equilibrium the wage schedule for di⁄erent worker
qualities will be given by this equation.
An alternative approach, which however will not be pursued here, is to assume
that there are two or more ￿rms and these are Bertrand oligopsonists. Each ￿rm
announces the wage it is willing to pay for each type of worker, and workers go to
the ￿rm o⁄ering the highest wage, ties being broken arbitrarily. The ￿ equilibrium￿
of this oligopsony is simply the Nash equilibrium of the normal-form game among
5the ￿rms. As we know from standard oligopsony, in equilibrium each ￿rm will
earn zero pro￿t. The logic of this is obvious. If there is a ￿rm that earns positive
pro￿t, then another ￿rm could o⁄er its workers a slightly higher wage and woe
them away. So the initial outcome would not have been a Nash equilibrium. If,
in addition, we assume away the integer problem, that is, assume that, for each
wage announced by the ￿rm, either no worker will agree to work or any number
of workers will, then the wage schedule in equilibrium will be exactly as shown by
the above equation (3).
We shall however go with the traditional approach of taking this to be a model
of perfectly competitive ￿rms with free entry.
2.2 Endogenizing Level of Education
Let us now allow for the possibility that individuals do not come with an
immutable skill level but can acquire skill through education. To make it possible
to conduct a formal analysis, we have to take a slightly novel route in developing
the idea of an equilibrium. We shall assume that there are two-periods. In the ￿rst,
workers choose their level of education and in the second period, with education
as given, ￿rms make their decisions as in a standard competitive model with
free entry, in other words, exactly as described in the above section. In the ￿rst
period, the workers essentially do a Nash-type calculation. That is, each worker
calculates what would happen if he or she deviated and chose some other level
of education. If she could not do better by any such deviation, then the existing
choice of education for all workers is an ￿ equilibrium￿ .
Formally, in the ￿rst period, each worker chooses to obtain a certain level of
skill q through education. We will assume that the cost of education that provides
the level of skill q is given by c(q) with c0 (q) ￿ 0: In the second period, the ￿rms
take their decisions about what kinds of workers to hire for the di⁄erent tasks, with
wages being treated as exogenous by each ￿rm. The second period equilibrium
is reached when we ￿nd a wage schedule (that is, a wage of each level of skill)
such that each ￿rm maximizes pro￿ts and earns zero. In other words, the second
6period works as described in the previous section (2.1). After the second period,
￿rms earn their payo⁄s (we already know this will be zero in equilibrium) and
each worker receives his or her payo⁄, which is equal to the wage earned by the
worker minus the cost of education.
In de￿ning the equilibrium formally in this two-period model, let us focus on a
re￿nement of what was described informally above. The re￿nement is an outcome
in which all workers voluntarily choose the same level of skill. We shall call this
the ￿ symmetric equilibrium￿ , with the frequent indulgence of dropping the epithet
￿ symmetric￿ , since we are not going to talk about a non-symmetric equilibrium in
this paper.
A skill level q and a wage equal to qnB for each of these workers is a (sym-
metric) equilibrium if and only if
1. qnB ￿ c(q) and
2. for all b q, the wage that a worker who individually deviates to b q earns is such
that wage minus the cost of that education, namely, c(b q), is less than or
equal to qnB ￿ c(q):
In other words, all workers earn enough to cover their education cost and no
worker by unilaterally deviating to some other level of education can do better.
To formalize condition (2), we need to describe what the wage a worker who
unilaterally deviates to b q when everybody else has chosen q, will earn. With a
slight abuse of notation, denote this wage by w(b q;q) and denote the pro￿t of the
￿rm hiring this person by ￿ (b q;q): Clearly,
￿ (b q;q) = b qqn￿1nB ￿ (n ￿ 1)w(q) ￿ w(b q;q)
= b qqn￿1nB ￿ (n ￿ 1)qnB ￿ w(b q;q):
The ￿rm will hire this worker if and only if
￿ (b q;q) ￿ ￿ (q) = 0:
7Therefore, w(b q;q) is the maximum possible wage the worker can get while
ensuring that the above inequality is satis￿ed. Otherwise the ￿rm will refuse to
employ this worker. It is now easy to derive that when all other workers have skill
q; the wage of a worker with skill b q will be given by:
w(b q;q) = b qqn￿1nB ￿ (n ￿ 1)qnB: (4)
What is interesting and makes our analysis easy to conduct is a property of
w(b q;q): The property is the following. The graph of w(b q;q) as b q changes is always
given by the straight line that is tangent to w(q) (= qnB) at q:
What we are now ready to demonstrate is that this model can have multiple
symmetric equilibria. In other words, it is possible to have a very low level of
education which is an equilibrium in the sense that if everybody chooses it, nobody
can do better by deviating, and there is also a possibility of a very high level of
education in equilibrium. A society can simply get caught in a low literacy trap.
Between two societies, one highly skilled and another with rudimentary skills there
may be no fundamental di⁄erence. They can be mere victims of their history.
Using the property of w(b q;q) mentioned above, these results are easy to prove.
This can be done with a few simple examples; and that is what we do presently.
The last section of the paper goes into the large policy implications for what the
government could do to promote education and the acquisition of human capital
and skills.
3 Linear Cost Function and Literacy Trap
Consider a linear cost function for education as follows. Individuals are born
with some level of skill, say z: Alternatively, this is a level of skill that comes to us
costlessly. Most human beings can perform basic tasks without having to undergo
any formal training. To acquire skill beyond z, a worker has to incur a cost, which
increases linearly with the level of skill. To sum up, the cost of education for
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a(q ￿ z); for z < q ￿ 1
(5)













The ￿rst assumption guarantees that the cost of education is neither very
high so that no one chooses to get more skill than z; nor very low so that everyone
chooses to become an expert. The second assumption guarantees that c(q) ￿ w(q)
for all q 2 [0;1]:
De￿ne q such that







q is illustrated in Figure (1).
Claim 1 Every worker acquiring skill q and earning a wage of qnB is an equilib-
rium.
Proof. Suppose all workers have chosen q: We know that perfect competition
among ￿rms with free entry will drive wages to qnB: It has already been seen
earlier that ￿rms o⁄er the wage structure w(:;:) given by (4) optimally and none
of the ￿rms deviate from o⁄ering this.
Let us now check how a worker, who unilaterally deviates from q will do. Note
that by assumption (6);w(q) ￿ c(q) and z < q < 1: Now, from (4); we have
@w(q;q)
@q
= qn￿1nB = w0 (q) = a:
This implies that w(q;q) is parallel to c(q) for all q 2 [z;1]. This in turn
means that
w(q;q) ￿ c(q) = w(q;q) ￿ c(q) for all q 2 [z;1]:
9But, w(q;q) = w(q): Therefore,
w(q) ￿ c(q) ￿ w(q;q) ￿ c(q) for all q 2 [0;1]:
Hence, q is an equilibrium. It is interesting to note that deviations to the
interval [z;1] leave the deviating worker exactly as well o⁄ as before, and all other
deviations make the worker worse o⁄.
Figure 1: Linear cost function
Claim 2 In this example, with linear cost function given by (5), there are two
other equilibria, one in which all workers choose q￿ = z and another in which all
workers choose q￿ = 1.
Proof. First, suppose all workers choose q￿ = 1 and one of them contemplates
deviating from this common choice to a lower level of quality b q < 1. Again the
10tangent line to the graph of w(q) at q￿ = 1 gives the wage for obtaining quality
b q. Now, for all b q < q￿; the following is true:
@w(b q;q￿)
@b q
= w0 (q￿) > w0 (q) = a:
The inequality holds because w(q) is a convex function and q￿ = 1 > q: Therefore,
the loss in wages due to deviation to b q from q￿ more than o⁄sets the cost savings
since w(b q;q￿) is more steeply sloped than the cost function. Thus deviation would
lead to a lower payo⁄.
Similarly, if all workers choose q￿ = z, then deviation to b q > z is not advanta-
geous since q￿ = z < q implies that
@w(b q;q￿)
@b q
= w0 (q￿) < w0 (q) = a:
Finally, deviation to b q < z lowers wages without reducing costs, so workers won￿ t
do that.
It is easy to see that there does not exist any other equilibrium apart from the
three described above in this model with the linear cost function given by (5):
3.1 Literacy Trap and Big Push
Note that, while q is an equilibrium, it is not ￿ stable￿in the following sense. In
a society where all the workers are skilled upto level q; if it is possible to increase
everyone￿ s skill a little bit, then each of the workers will deviate further away from
q. That is, they will increase their skill; and note that this dynamic will continue
till the equilibrium q￿ is reached or gradually approached: On the other hand, if
everybody￿ s skill was lowered a little, then a downward dynamic would start up
and society could go all the way to the equilibrium q￿:
Finally, we have a big ￿ literacy trap￿at the education-level which provides skill
q￿ = z: A ￿ big push￿that drives the entire economy beyond the skill-level q can
start up innate forces that will then take the economy all the way to the good
equilibrium. All smaller e⁄orts will keep pulling workers back to q￿ = z. This has
one heartening implication. In an economy with widespread illiteracy, the cost
11of raising human capital may not be as much as appears at ￿rst sight. This is
because the funding needed to promote education will not have to be sustained
endlessly through time. As soon as a threshold is crossed, the accumulation of
human capital and skills can be left to natural forces and will continue unabated.
4 More General Cost Function and Literacy Trap
Figure 2: Non-linear cost function with multiple equilibria
Though we illustrated our main results with the linear case, there is no need
to con￿ne the analysis to such cases. Virtually all results carry over to the more
general, nonlinear cases. Consider the non-linear cost function as shown in Figure
(2). As in case of linear cost function, suppose primary education that provides
skill z is free. Then the cost of education increases at an increasing rate. After
some point, the behavior of the cost function changes and as someone gets more
12educated, the less is his marginal cost of education. After a very high level of
education, the marginal cost starts increasing again.
It is clear from the largely self-explanatory ￿gure above that even with non-
linear cost of education we may have multiple equilibria. In this particular exam-
ple, we have two symmetric and strict Nash equilibria. As shown in Figure (2),
q￿ and q￿ with ￿rms o⁄ering wages w(:) given by (3) are the two Nash equilibria
and both are stable. Thus a literacy trap may occur in a society where all the
workers optimally choose to attain the skill q￿:
5 Policy Interventions
Increasing literacy and the advancement of human capital has been a major
focus of policy-making certainly in developing countries but also in developed
nations. Evidently, there are two sides to this policy. There has to be a demand
for education on the part of parents taking decisions for their children and young
adults taking decisions for their own education. Secondly, there has to be a supply
of schools so that parents who wish to educate their children can do so. In popular
discourse, it is often said that poor parents do not want to educate their children.
This has met, rightly, with strong criticism (see PROBE Team, 1999). However,
this must not blind us to the fact that the intensity of demand for education
can vary and this can make a di⁄erence to the literacy outcome of a nation (see
PROBE Team, 1999; DrŁze and Kingdon, 2001). It is believed that the rewards
from education ￿the so-called ￿ skill premium￿￿have been rising in the developing
world; and there is now some hard evidence on this (see Arbache, Dickerson and
Green, 2004; Azam, 2009). When this happens, it is not surprising to ￿nd that the
demand for getting education will also become stronger. It is now said in India,
given that missionary schools had historically played a major role in the country,
that all you have to do is to think of a good English name, like John or Thomas
or Mary and add the pre￿x "Saint" and su¢ x "School" to it; and you will be in
the education business with students ￿ ocking to you.
13In our model, it is easy to see that the same country where the demand for
education is low because the skill premium is low can change to an equilibrium
with high premium and high demand for education. In Figure (1), if we start
from a case where the country is caught at a low literacy trap at z, it is not
worthwhile for any individual to seek more education. The skill premium is just
not high enough to make this worthwhile. If, on the other hand, education rises
and goes past q for everybody, then people will invest even more in education and
the nation will come to rest at a very high level of education for all.
Our model allows us to separate out the demand and supply aspects quite
neatly and so enables us to take a more sophisticated view on policy. We can think
of government-subsidized education as an intervention which lowers the cost of
education. This can have interesting e⁄ects depending on how it is done. Suppose
government gives a small ￿ at subsidy s for all levels of education. Contrary to
what is presumed, this may have no e⁄ect on education. This will be true for all
the equilibria depicted in Figures (1) and (2), excepting at z in Figure (1). To
boost education, government has to vary the subsidy with respect to the level of
education. In other words, the government needs to have a non-constant function
s(q). The total cost of education is then given by [c(q) ￿ s(q)]. By suitably altering
the slope of s(q); the state can boost education. Indeed the net expenditure on
education could be very small if the subsidy function is chosen artfully. If the
economy is caught at equilibrium z in Figure (1), then a constant small subsidy
will have a small positive e⁄ect on education. Beyond a critical point, it will have
a huge e⁄ect, pushing skill acquisition all the way to the maximum value 1, with
no need for any subsidy in the new equilibrium.
The model suggests that the ￿scal burden of boosting education may not be
too high, because all we need is a short period boost, after which the natural
incentives in the system kick in and little further outside intervention is needed.
For this same reason, it may be worthwhile for a country caught in a low-literacy
equilibrium to have a policy of compulsory education, which forces parents to
educate their children. If this can be sustained for a while, the need for force
14will vanish since the high education of the rest of the population will raise the
education premium for each individual.
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